Elusive Thoughts

Claude Code Hooks: The Deterministic Security Layer Your AI Agent Needs > APPSEC_ENGINEERING // CLAUDE_CODE // FIELD_REPORT Claude Code Hooks: The Deterministic Security Layer Your AI Agent Needs CLAUDE.md rules are suggestions. Hooks are enforced gates. exit 2 = blocked. No negotiation. If you're letting an AI agent write code without guardrails, here's how you fix that. // March 2026 • 12 min read • security-first perspective Why This Matters (Or: How Your AI Agent Became an Insider Threat) Since the corporate suits decided to go all in with AI (and fire half of the IT population), the market has changed dramatically, let's cut through the noise. The suits in the boardroom are excited about AI agents. "Autonomous productivity!" they say. "Digital workforce!" they cheer. Meanwhile, those of us who actually hack things for a living are watching these agents get deployed with shell access, API keys, and service-l...

The suits are rushing to integrate "AI" into every internal workflow, and they’re doing it with the grace of a bull in a china shop. If you aren't hardening your Large Language Model (LLM) implementation, you aren't just deploying a tool; you're deploying a remote code execution (RCE) vector with a personality. Here is the hardcore reality of securing LLMs in a corporate environment. 1. The "Shadow AI" Black Hole Your devs are already pasting proprietary code into unsanctioned models. It’s the new "Shadow IT." The Fix: Implement a Corporate LLM Gateway . Block direct access to openai.com or anthropic.com at the firewall. The Tech: Force all traffic through a local proxy (like LiteLLM or a custom Nginx wrapper) that logs every prompt, redacts PII/Secrets using Presidio , and enforces API key rotation. 2. Indirect Prompt Injection (The Silent Killer) This is where the real fun begins. If your LLM has access to the web or internal docs (RAG...

External Service Interaction & Out-of-Band Resource Loads — Updated 2026 External Service Interaction & Out-of-Band Resource Loads Host Header Exploitation // SSRF Primitives // Infrastructure Pivoting SSRF Host Header Injection CWE-918 OWASP A10:2021 Cache Poisoning Updated 2026 In the recent past we encountered two relatively new types of attacks: External Service Interaction (ESI) and Out-of-Band Resource Loads (OfBRL). An ESI [1] occurs only when a web application allows interaction with an arbitrary external service. OfBRL [6] arises when it is possible to induce an application to fetch content from an arbitrary external location, and incorporate that content into the application's own response(s). Taxonomy Note (2026): Both ESI and OfBRL are now classified under OWASP A10:2021 — SSRF and map to CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery). ESI also maps to CWE-441 (Unintentional Pro...