Elusive Thoughts

Claude Stress Neurons & Cybersecurity /ai_pentesting /neurosec /enterprise CLAUDE STRESS NEURONS How emergent “stress circuits” inside Claude‑style models could rewire blue‑team workflows, red‑team tradecraft, and the entire threat model of big‑corp cybersecurity. MODE: deep‑dive AUTHOR: gk // 0xsec STACK: LLM x Neurosec x AppSec Claude doesn’t literally grow new neurons when you put it under pressure, but the way its internal features light up under high‑stakes prompts feels dangerously close to a digital fight‑or‑flight response. Inside those billions of parameters, you get clusters of activations that only show up when the model thinks the stakes are high: security reviews, red‑team drills, or shutdown‑style questions that smell like an interrog...

The suits are rushing to integrate "AI" into every internal workflow, and they’re doing it with the grace of a bull in a china shop. If you aren't hardening your Large Language Model (LLM) implementation, you aren't just deploying a tool; you're deploying a remote code execution (RCE) vector with a personality. Here is the hardcore reality of securing LLMs in a corporate environment. 1. The "Shadow AI" Black Hole Your devs are already pasting proprietary code into unsanctioned models. It’s the new "Shadow IT." The Fix: Implement a Corporate LLM Gateway . Block direct access to openai.com or anthropic.com at the firewall. The Tech: Force all traffic through a local proxy (like LiteLLM or a custom Nginx wrapper) that logs every prompt, redacts PII/Secrets using Presidio , and enforces API key rotation. 2. Indirect Prompt Injection (The Silent Killer) This is where the real fun begins. If your LLM has access to the web or internal docs (RAG...

 Introduction  As Crypto currency technologies are becoming more and more prevalent, as the time is passing by, and banks will soon start adopting them. Ethereum blockchain and other complex blockchain programs are relatively new and highly experimental. Therefore, we should expect constant changes in the security landscape, as new bugs and security risks are discovered, and new best practices are developed [1].This article is going to discuss how to perform a source code review in Ethereum Smart Contracts (SCs) and what to look for. More specifically we are going to focus in specific keywords and how to analyse them.  The points analysed are going to be: User supplied input filtering, when interacting directly with SC Interfacing with external SCs Interfacing with DApp applications SC formal verification Wallet authentication in DApp SC Programming Mindset When designing an SC ecosystem (a group of SCs, constitutes an ecosystem) is it wise to have some specific concepts ...

Introduction The reason for this blog post is to advertise my book. First of all I would like to thank all the readers of my blog for the support and feedback on making my articles better. After 12+ years in the penetration testing industry, the time has come for me to publish my book and tranfer my knowledge to all the intersted people that like hacking and want to learn as much as possible. Also at the end of the blog you will find a sample chapter. About The Author Gerasimos is a security consultant holding a MSc in Information Security, a CREST (CRT), a CISSP, an ITILv3, a GIAC GPEN and a GIAC GAWPT accreditation. Working alongside diverse and highly skilled teams Gerasi- mos has been involved in countless comprehensive security tests and web application secure development engagements for global web applications and network platforms, counting more than 14 years in the web application and application security architecture. Gerasimos further progressing in h...

Filename   Brute-forcing  through MultiViews Vulnerability This is a small post about a way to easily get backup files on Apache web servers with Multiviews option enabled. There is no much information in Multiviews (an Apache feature) and some Web Application scanners report this as Apache mod_negotiation filename brute-forcing rather than Multiviews option enabled. Apache HTTPD supports content negotiation as described in the HTTP/1.1 specification (see http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616.html ). It can choose the best representation of a resource based on the browser-supplied preferences for media type, languages, character set and encoding. It also implements a couple of features to give more intelligent handling of requests from browsers that send incomplete negotiation information. What are resources A resource is a conceptual entity identified by a URI (RFC 2396). An HTTP server like Apache HTTP Server provides access to representations of the resource(s...